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I.
In a recent review article John  Fisher posed the question of whether or 
not
...the Bourbon reforms tend to bewitch all who study them. Did they really 
comprise the smooth, coherent, masterly program  of imperial change and 
revival that generations of commentators, from the very imperial policy 
makers of eighteenth century Spain to the researchers of today have identi­
fied? M ight they not be more realistically depicted in terms of a halting, 
uncertain, inconsistent desire for imperial modernization and centralization, 
characterized more by delay, contradiction and obstruction than by decisive­
ness?1
It is a question well worth asking but one which still awaits a satisfactory 
response. Certainly in the following analysis of the Royal Tobacco 
Monopoly of New Spain, evidence presented can only be used to support 
the traditional view of the Bourbon reforms. The monopoly’s adminis­
tration and managem ent illustrates not just the organizational capacity of 
the Bourbon reformers but the lenghts to which they were prepared to go 
to ensure its success in producing revenues for the Spanish crown. 
Behind those revenues, however, lies a hitherto virtually untouched 
history of how the establishment of the monopoly affected New Spain 
and those individuals caught in the changes it wrought.^ Emphasis will 
be placed on two groups affected by the imposition of the monopoly: the 
tobacco growers and the cigarreros (private tobacco store owners). Before 
exam ining what happened to these groups a brief look at the back­
ground to, and fiscal structure of the Tobacco Monopoly is in order.
T he monopolization of tobacco in New Spain came relatively late 
compared to other Spanish American colonies. A formal monopoly had 
been established in C uba in 1717, in Peru by 1752 and in 1753 Chile 
and La Plata were added to the Peruvian jurisdiction. Venezuela, 
G uatem ala, Costa Rica and Nueva G ranada joined the group in 1778, 
thirteen years after it had been established in New Spain. Monopolies 
were established in the Philippines in 1782 and Puerto Rico in 1783.
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The Visitor G eneral, José de Gálvez, had always supported the idea 
of such a monopoly in New Spain and was only too well aware of its 
revenue potential. W riting to the Viceroy in 1766, he commented:
Muchos son los millones que perdió la Corona en tantos años que ha corrido 
el tabaco por toda la América Española como género de libre comercio. Mas 
de un  siglo ha que el Venerable Dn. Ju a n  de Palafox aconsejó al Conde de 
Salvatierra ... que se estancara el tabaco ... pero ha sido, tal la desidia de 
los que han gobernado estos Dominios distantes del Trono, que, ó no pen­
saron en los asuntos más im portantes, ó se finixieron dificultades que nunca 
hubo. 3
Reluctance to establish a monopoly can be partially explained by a fear 
of hostility on the part of vested interests.
Yet those fears and objections were superseded by a greater threat -  
possible defeat at the hands of the British. M ilitary reform was necessary 
and the costs of raising regular and militia units in New Spain made the 
imposition of new taxes im perative as did the general war effort of the 
peninsula. Since tobacco was deemed to be a substance unnecessary to 
sustain hum an life, the creation of the monopoly was judged to be the 
fairest and least burdensome way of generating new revenues. T he 
C row n’s decision was made public in two royal decrees of Decem ber 14, 
1764 and January  18, 1765.4 Profits received from the Tobacco
Monopoly along with those from the playing card and quicksilver 
monopolies were to be placed into the masa remisible and shipped 
directly to Spain. Production was for the domestic market only.
Designed to secure control over tobacco and tobacco products 
throughout the colony, the monopoly was placed in the hands of a 
professional, salaried bureaucracy. T he Viceroy, acting as President of 
the Ju n ta  de Tabaco, met and conferred periodically with the members 
of the General Directorate. All policy decisions were taken at this level. 
Selection of personnel was the responsability of the General Directorate, 
accounts and finance were administered by the Contaduría and Tesorería 
sections. Bureaucrats were paid fixed annual salaries while other 
employees such as the mem bers of the Resguardo  units were paid fixed 
daily wages. By 1790 there were an estimated 17,256 individuals 
employed and paid by the monopoly.
By' 1810 New Spain provided three quarters of all profits received 
from  the Spanish colonies. T he contribution made to those profits by the 
sale of tobacco was substantial and, after silver, was probably the most 
lucrative source of revenue to which the Spanish Crown had access. As
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can bee seen from  G raph I, using current pesos (nominal) total receipts 
from  the monopoly followed a secular upward trend to nine and one half 
million pesos by 1809; profits grew steadily until 1799 when the trend 
seemed to stabilize at between three and one half and four million pesos. 
It should be noted here that state m anagem ent of the tobacco industry 
was not apparently as efficient as that of private control -  one estimate 
of the values of tobacco sales in 1748 for all of New Spain was placed at
12,348,000 pesos.5 In order to express the value of these receipts, 
however, in terms of their purchasing power, the data have been defla­
ted by an index of maize prices based on Florescano’s Mexico City 
figures. T he deflated data (Table I, G raph II) show that the highest 
point and longest period of sustained increase in the value of tobacco 
receipts occurred by 1792 when total receipts reached nine million pesos 
and stabilized thereafter at around seven million pesos; profits reached 
their peak of five million pesos in 1792, thereafter fluctuating between 
three million and four million pesos. Hence, in real term s, the high point 
of fiscal returns from  tobacco occurred well before 1809 although the 
income from  the sale of the tobacco products remained substantial until 
the outbreak of the insurgency in 1810. Not surprisingly, the most 
lucrative administrations were Mexico City and its environs (Q uerétaro 
came under its jurisdiction), Valladolid and G uadalajara.
T hroughout the period, the General D irectorate was concerned to 
keep prices of tobacco products at a reasonably moderate level in order 
to avoid encouraging contraband. Nevertheless, prices were increased 
twice -  in 1777 and 1800. Until the first increase consumers could 
purchase a pack of cigarros containing between forty -  two and sixty 
cigarros, according to the quality, for one half real. Papeles de puros 
(packs of cigars) containing between six and sixteen puros, again 
depending on their class, could also be purchased for one half real. With 
an eye to reaching all types of consumers, certain types of cigarros 
could also be sold in sets of twelve for one tlaco (there were five tlacos to 
one half real).^ L eaf tobacco was sold at six reales per pound in the 
General Administration of Mexico but at seven and one half reales in 
C hihuahua. A fter 1777, however, this price of leaf was standardized 
throughout the colony at eight reales per pound. T he price of cigarros 
and puros was then increased by reducing the quantity contained in each 
packet. T he num ber of cigarros ranged between thirty -  six and 
forty -  eight per pack and between five and forteen per pack of puros. 
A fter 1800, leaf sold at ten reales per pound, puros remained the same, 
cigarros were now sold in packs containing between forty -  two and thirty
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for one half real.8 It should be noted that although the cost of tobacco 
products to the consumer increased, the cost of leaf tobacco purchased by 
the crown did not. T he ability o f the G eneral Directorate to maintain 
the same purchase price of tobacco from the growers for almost forty 
years is crucial to an understanding of the fiscal success of the monopo­
ly. This is one of the issues with which we shall deal in the next 
section.
TABLE I: Total Receipts, Costs o f  Production and N et Profits o f  the
Royal Tobacco M onopoly, 1765 -  1809 (Current and 
Constant Pesos)
YEAR T O TA L R EC EIPTS T O TA L  COSTS N ET PR O FITS
Nominal Deflated Nom inal Deflated Nominal Deflated
1787 5,957,720 2,984,531 3,036,655 1,521,218 2,921,065 1,463,313
1788 6,243,183 3,463,298 3,336,942 1,851,111 2,906,241 1,612,187
1789 6,293,182 3,910,922 2,682,971 1,667,343 3,610,211 2,243,579
1790 6,235,315 4,404,715 2,837,349 2,004,344 3,397,966 2,400,372
1791 6,485,627 5,939,763 3,058,789 2,801,345 3,426,838 3,138,417
1792 6,705,635 9,260,648 2,991,004 4,130,650 3,714,632 5,129,999
1793 6,684,864 6,811,559 3,258,772 3,320,534 3,426,092 3,491,025
1794 6,526,352 5,288,711 3,417,540 2,758,973 3,108,812 2,509,738
1795 6,975,463 4,662,743 3,039,864 2,031,995 3,935,599 2,630,748
1796 7,336,540 7,527,747 3,400,312 3,488,931 3,986,228 4,090,117
1797 7,660,350 6,271,265 3,847,000 3,149,406 3,813,350 3,121,858
1798 8,251,574 5,220,202 3,711,778 2,348,186 4,539,796 2,872,016
1799 7,521,621 5,297,289 4,125,232 2,905,298 3,396,390 2,391,992
1800 7,433,159 5,145,479 4,020,559 2,783,164 3,412,600 2,362,315
1801 7,825,914 5,978,087 3,832,079 2,927,262 3,993,834 3,050,824
1802 7,686,835 4,006,064 3,594,205 1,873,152 4,092,630 2,132,911
1803 7,747,529 5,558,817 4,196,914 3,010,915 3,550,615 2,547,252
1804 7,910,719 7,493,339 4,125,747 3,908,068 3,784,972 3,585,272
1805 8,599,624 6,531,691 4,352,379 3,305,772 4,274,345 3,246,502
1806 9,116,393 6,141,466 5,255,066 3,540,195 3,861,327 2,601,272
1807 9,417,205 6,832,478 6,287,483 4,561,767 3,129,781 2,270,755
1808 9,061,468 5,214,333 4,613,982 2,655,071 4,447,486 2,575,014
1809 9,558,698 5,126,682 5,978,748 3,206,623 3,579,950 1,920,059
Source: Fonseca y U rrutía, Libro de la .Real Hacienda Vol. VII; Relaciones
Generales for years 1 790- 1809, extracted from various volumes of the 
Ramo de Tabaco, Archivo General de la Nación, México;
E. Florescano, Precios del m aíz y  crisis agrícolas en México 1 7 0 8-1810  
(México, 1969). Base years for the maize price index: 1 726- 1742 = 
100 .
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II.
Apart from  the creation of the extensive administrative machinery 
which provided the base of the monopoly operations, three m ajor steps 
were taken to ensure complete control over tobacco: the restriction of 
tobacco cultivation, elimination of the cigarrerías and the erection of the 
state tobacco factories and estanquillos (monopoly tobacco stores). Not all 
were achieved at the same time and, as we shall see, the Spanish 
Crown was not in complete control of income from  sales of tobacco until 
1775.
In 1765, m erchants and dealers throughout New Spain were required 
to declare all their tobacco stocks and sell them  to specially appointed 
officials representing the new monopoly. Cultivation of tobacco was 
henceforth declared illegal with the exception of that grown in what is 
today the state of V eracruz. M ore specifically, the area chosen encom­
passed the villas of O rizaba, C órdoba, Huatusco and Zongolica. Prior to 
the monopoly, tobacco was grown as a cash crop mainly in G uadala­
ja ra , Puebla and O axaca. Very little is known as to actual numbers 
involved and the real impact of the monopoly prohibition for these 
growers. Evidently whatever protests were made by these growers fell on 
deaf ears. T he advice was to convert to other crops. A less acceptable 
alternative as fa r as the Spanish Crown was concerned was, of course, 
contraband. Given the efforts put into eliminating clandestine cultivation 
of tobacco, some growers found contraband a viable option.
T he areas in Veracruz were chosen partly for the quality of the 
tobacco produced there and partly for the relative ease with which illegal 
cultivation could be controlled by reason of the geographical features of 
the region. By 1803 the Intendancy of V eracruz covered 4,141 square 
leagues and had a population of 156,000, a ratio of approximately 
th ir ty -e ig h t inhabitants per square league.9 Such a low population 
created an enormous obstacle to the development of urban centers, 
commerce and local artesan crafts in view of the lack of sustained 
dem and from  local markets. V eracruz remained throughout the colonial 
period a region dependent upon its agricultural products, most notably 
vanilla, sugar, cotton, maize and tobacco. Sugar and tobacco were the 
m ajor crops of the growing zone prior to the implem entation of the 
monopoly. In order to take a closer look at the tobacco growers, 
emphasis will be placed on O rizaba as it is impossible to deal with all 
four areas in this paper.
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Towards the end of the seventeenth century tobacco had slowly begun 
to displace sugar as the dominant cash crop of O rizaba. By the early 
1700’s O rizaba had gained fam e as one of the most im portant tobacco-  
producing regions of the colony. A wide -  leaf plant was cultivated (of 
the species Nicotiana Tabacum) which produced a good, aromatic 
tobacco. T hus, since a shift had occurred away from  sugar to tobacco 
almost fifty years before the monopoly, the Spanish Crown simply 
accelerated a trend that already was under way.
W hile tobacco growers in G uadalajara wondered how to make their 
future living, the growers in O rizaba contemplated their new situation. 
Instructions were given that diputados (representatives) were to be elected 
from  the común de cosecheros. These had to travel to Mexico City 
where, theoretically, they negotiated with the General Directorate for 
satisfactory prices at which they would sell their tobacco to the monopo­
ly. T he relationship between the monopoly and the growers was carried 
out via a contract system. Such contracts stipulated prices, conditions of 
delivery, packaging, deductions to be made for waste and shrinkage and 
the duration of each contract. T he General Directorate decided how 
much tobacco had to be produced in order to satisfy the needs of the 
domestic market. Licenses were issued to each planter who had agreed to 
the new contract stating how many matas (plants) he had been allocated. 
T he eventual am ount was a compromise between how many tercios of 
tobacco the General Directorate required, how many growers wished to 
contract and the production capacity of each .1® Growers were then 
bound by these conditions. Excess cultivation of tobacco by growers 
above their license allocation was treated as contraband activity. A fter 
delivery at the monopoly warehouse in O rizaba, each p lanter’s tercios of 
tobacco were weighed, evaluated and, after deductions such as the alca­
bala (6 percent) and diezm o  (8 percent), he received a cash payment. 
For its part, the monopoly represented a guaranteed buyer and, of far 
more significance, it advanced to the planters interest -  free credit to help 
cover costs of production.11 It seems that this was done in order to 
ensure that the required production levels were met by the growers. Left 
to their own resources, apparently, the majority would have been unable 
to increase the quantity of tobacco cultivated. W riting to the Viceroy in 
1764, the m an who was to become the first D irector General of the 
monopoly, Jacin to  Espinosa commented:
...los labradores cosecheros y rancheros que se ocupan y emplean en la siem­
bra y cultivo de tabacos en Orizaba y Córdoba ... son pobres y que piden a 
los Hacenderos y m archantes algún dinero para el havio de sus gastos de
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siembra ... por lo que se hace preciso e indispensable se les proponga y 
asegure que por cuenta de la Real Hacienda se les subm inistran y anticipara 
el mismo havio que antes ... en dinero efectivo y no en otras especies —
Another adviser to the General D irectorate, Don Antonio Carlin, ob­
served that prior to the monopoly few growers cultivated more than
30.000 or 40,000 matas. Considering that by the beginning of the 1770’s
100.000 matas was to be the average num ber planted by many growers 
with some receiving licenses to plant 5,000,000, then clearly an intensi­
fication of cultivation was under way.
Any illusions that the deputies elected by the growers could influence 
the contracts drawn up were soon destroyed. By 1772 they were refusing 
to agree to further contracts until the prices offered by the monopoly 
were increased. Indeed, in 1777 the deputies and the común de cose­
cheros were abolished. T he growers found themselves unable to bargain. 
In 1765 prices for tobacco were set at three and one fourth reales a 
pound of first grade tobacco, two and one half reales a pound of second 
grade, one real a pound of third grade and punta  was to be purchased at 
twenty -  four reales an arroba .13 Gálvez, the Visitor G eneral, furious 
that the prices had been set so high, at least by his standards, declared 
that they must be reduced. T hus, the second contract drawn up in 1767 
stipulated that the prices for first, second, third grade tobaccos and punta  
were to be set at three reales, two reales, one real and twenty -  four 
reales respectively. Between 1765 and 1810 fifteen m ajor contracts were 
drawn up and agreed upon despite continuous and severe conflict 
between the growers and the monopoly. Prices were always the central 
point of contention. O n two occasions planters complained that it was 
simply not worth their while to continue growing tobacco at the prices 
offered and that there was no point in signing a contract. O n both 
occasions the monopoly, with royal approval, took the same action. The 
General Directorate ordered the Factor of O rizaba to buy up or rent as 
many tobacco ranchos as possible so that the Crown could cultivate its 
own tobacco, thus bypassing the recalcitrant planters. Shortages of 
tobacco were to be met by imports from  C uba and Louisiana. Both 
options proved extreemly costly to the crown, but they served their pu r­
pose. T he growers eventually submitted and accepted the prices offered 
by the monopoly. By 1810 they were still being paid the same prices 
stipulated in the 1767 contract (with the exception of punta  which had 
been lowered to twenty -  two reales per arroba). M oreover, following the 
abolition of the común de cosecheros and dissolution of general contracts
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(a tem porary measure) those growers who contracted individually did so 
at lower prices still -  two and three -  fourths reales, one and three -  
fourths reales, one real for first, second and third grades, and 
twenty -  two reales per arroba of punta . 14 T hus most growers eventu­
ally faced a fall in real income during the inflationary years of the late 
eighteenth century as costs of labour and basic necessities increased, a 
situation which was acknowledged by the Director General.*"’ Yet for 
whatever reasons, economic, political or a combination of both, the 
growers continued to supply the monopoly with tobacco during the 
chaotic period between 1810 and 1821, often without receiving full 
payment for the value of their tobacco.1®
Given the paucity of information concerning the tobacco trade and 
planters prior to 1765, any comparison between pre -  and p o st-  
monopoly situations is rendered extremely difficult. The best that can be 
done at the moment is to take a brief look at the planter group of 
O rizaba.
O ne advantage of the contract system and licensing of growers was 
that those growers known as los cosecheros verdaderos were given 
preference when the tobacco quota was allocated between the planters. 
Partly to prevent an influx of potential tobacco growers tempted by the 
thought of in te re s t-f re e  credit, those individuals known to have made 
their living from growing tobacco prior to the monopoly, especially those 
with their own ranchos and equipm ent were permitted to request their 
preferred quantity of matas first. T he monopoly, of course, did have a 
vested interest in this. Subsistence farm ers with few tools and even less 
skill at growing tobacco were not in a position to produce high quality 
tobacco which satisfied the consumer. At the same time, a limit on the 
num ber of growers who could contract meant that growers were more 
likely to receive the quantity of matas requested. Only when their allo­
cations had been made and if a quantity remained to be distributed 
would new growers be allowed to contract. T hus, a distinction can be 
made between a core group of planters, los cosecheros verdaderos, and 
the rest of the growers who were far less stable in their composition. 
W hile the form er group generally grew tobacco every year, the latter 
were a mixture of what appears to be a floating rural m igrant group, 
and local subsistence farm ers who grew tobacco when it was convenient
to do so. T hus determination of how many growers were involved is not 
1 7a simple exercise.
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If the num bers are measured by the quantity of licenses issued, then 
we get the following range of figures:
Y ear N um ber of Licenses Issued
1769 228
1774 200
1788 236
1789 290
1790 133
1795 227
1799 159
However, if the aviados of certain planters are added then the numbers 
increase. For the year 1789, for example, by adding the total num ber of 
aviados the num ber becomes 575. Conversely, the numbers are reduced 
if the am ount of harvests delivered to the monopoly warehouse is taken 
as a measurem ent:
Y ear N um ber of Harvests Received
1769 • 90
1774 138
1789 129
T he discrepancies can be accounted for, in part, by poorer growers 
selling their tobacco to wealthier growers after cutting the leaf since they 
could not afford to dry and cure their tobacco. A different set of figures 
is presented altogether if the num bers of planters receiving credit is taken 
as a m easurem ent as to how many individuals were involved.18
Y ear and N um ber of Growers Receiving Credit
1792 83 1799 56 1806 126
1793 70 1800 58 1807 148
1794 76 1801 56 1808 176
1795 65 1802 104 1809 176
1796 61 1804 82 1810 114
1798 60 1805 69 1811 110
T hus, for the moment, it seems as though the core group
numerical range of between 50 and 150. ^
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The credit advanced by the monopoly was not given to everyone. 
Planters had to be able to provide a suitable fiador and/or security 
against any credit borrowed. Restrictions were imposed on the use of 
monopoly credit to prevent it being invested in other interests. An overall 
am ount was decided depending upon the quantity of plants a grower had 
to cultivate. T he amounts and names were entered into registros de 
créditos. Amounts allocated were generally divided into two parts, the 
first to cover costs of growing the tobacco, the second to cover its bene­
ficio (curing, drying and packing). M oney for the latter operation was 
not delivered until monopoly officials, namely the Factor and the 
Inspector G eneral, were satisfied that the first credit quota had been 
used for its correct purpose.
Much of the credit advanced went to pay labour costs. O ne crucial 
feature to rem em ber about tobacco is that it was (and is) a labour 
intensive crop. T here was always a high demand for tabaqueros, 
especially skilled ones. Effectively, these workers could determine the 
quality of a p lan ter’s crop. Knowing when to cut the leaves, and how to 
cut them correctly was a skilled operation. Cutting too high, too low and 
too soon could mean the difference between a crop with a high propor­
tion of a high grade leaf, as opposed to one with predom inantly low 
grade leaf. Cuadrillas of Indians were brought in from the surrounding 
pueblos to perform  a variety of tasks. W orkers were needed for the 
preparation of seed beds, transplanting, weeding, topping, suckering, 
cutting, stringing and hanging the leaves, sorting and packing. Those 
planters who employed operarios on their tobacco ranchos paid them 
between two and three -  fourths reales and three reales per day (with or 
without food depending on the task).^® By 1800 growers were
complaining that costs of labour had risen to between three reales and 
four reales per day.^* Competition for skilled workers undoubtedly 
exercised an influence on rural wages, but so did competition between 
tobacco growers and sugar hacendados. It was not simply a question of a 
shortage of skilled tobacco workers but of workers in general.
Com m enting on the problems faced by tobacco growers, Antonio de 
Sobrevilla observed that the gente operaría constituted the greatest cost, 
not just for the jornales but for the money which remained owing to the 
growers from workers who ran away or died. Costs were increased
further by having to pay people to search for and bring back recalcitrant
• 22  operarios.
Any idea that the tobacco growers were akin to a homogeneous group 
of yeoman farm ers is firmly dismissed by looking at the following two
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examples: In 1779 the total value of tobacco cosechas in O rizaba
amounted to 240,085 pesos. O f that am ount 5 1/2 percent of the total
num ber of growers paid, received 40 percent of the value of the crop
with three growers receiving 61,942 pesos, 22,366 pesos and 11,303
pesos respectively.^ In  1792 the spectrum of payments included
M anuel José Hernández who received ten pesos from a crop worth 360
pesos after 'credit and other deductions had been made; Don Felipe
Torres received 331 pesos from a crop worth 3,531 pesos, while Da.
Bernarda Rendón received 21,416 pesos from her crop valued at 36,000 
24pesos.
T he differentiation of the planter group implied by these two 
examples is borne out if we take a closer look at the growers. Based on 
planter cultivation profiles the pattern of differentiation which emerged 
between the growers can be roughly described as follows:“^
1. an ’’elite” core of wealthy growers, the m erchant -  planters;
2 . a middle group, ranging from  prosperous to poor rancheros;
3. a marginal but e v e r-p re se n t group of subsistence farm ers, 
the pegujaleros.
The first group tended to be wealthy Spanish merchants for whom 
tobacco was one of several economic interests. O ften holding political 
posts they were more likely to live in the villa of O rizaba rather than on 
tobacco ranchos which they owned or rented. They employed mayordo­
mos to look after their tobacco crops and were aviadores for the bulk of 
the Indian growers and poor creole or mestizo planters. For 1789/90, for 
example, one of the most outstanding tobacco planters of O rizaba, Don 
Antonio Montes Argüelles had thirty -  eight creole and mestizo aviados 
distributed throughout the jurisdiction of O rizaba. H e was also aviador 
to 358 Indians of the Sierra de Tequila and forty -  eight Indians from 
Tom atlan. O n average, however, the num ber of aviados was much 
lower, varying from one to fifty. These planters generally cultivated 
between 600,000 and 5,000,000 matas. Argüelles is typical of this group. 
A peninsular Spaniard, he was a regidor of O rizaba. His house in the 
villa was valued at 20,000 pesos. H e owned two boticas and a general 
store valued at 30,000 pesos. His bulls for the abasto de cam e  of 
C órdoba and O rizaba were valued at 75,600 pesos and his tobacco 
ranchos (including stock) were worth 18,000 pesos. At the time of his 
death his total estate was valued at 283,600 pesos, 138,788 pesos after 
payment of debts.“7 So also, by 1810 Don Francisco Florentino Avila
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owned six houses, a tienda de comercio, two tobacco ranchos (valued at
6,000 pesos). His goods and properties were worth 56,800 pesos. Don
Domingo Piñeiro, Spanish, also by 1810 owned four houses, three
9fttobacco ranchos, and 150 mules, collectively worth 51,268 pesos. 
C learly these individuals were not solely dependent upon income received 
from  the sale of their tobacco crop. They could withstand bad years 
when the value of a harvest was low.
T he second group constitutes the majority of the core group of 
growers. These medium to small -  scale planters were generally creole or 
mestizo rancheros (the m ajority were probably arrendatarios).^  They 
were likely to live on their ranchos, have a few aviados, and cultivate 
between 100,000 and 500,000 plants. They generally owned livestock 
ranging from sheep to bulls. Values placed on ranchos which were 
owned by various planters ranged between 300 pesos and 3,000 pesos. 
T he main difference between this group and the previous one was that 
they were much more vulnerable to fluctuations in the tobacco harvest, 
this crop being their m ajor source of income. It should be noted here 
that one of the problems facing a  grower was that, if he borrowed a 
certain amount of credit based on an estimated value of his crop he ran 
the risk of finding that he could just about pay off the credit and other 
deductions. No adjustm ents were made for bad harvests, prices could not 
be increased. The m argin between profit and loss could be very thin 
indeed.
T he third group, the pegujaleros, according to the C om m ander of 
the resguardo, can be divided into two categories: Those individuals who 
owned their ranchelos and who knew no other profession than that of 
growing tobacco, and those of no fixed domicile who requested licenses 
at the time of the allocation of matas, generally cheated their aviadores 
and were a m ajor source of contraband for dealing in tobacco leaf.^® 
Generally mestizo or Indian (occasionally mulatto), they tended to culti­
vate between 6,000 and 60,000 plants.
T he pegujaleros were a source of contention between monopoly 
officials and the tobacco growers. In  the light of restricted quantities of 
tobacco to be harvested each year, the more growers there were the less 
num ber of plants were available for allocation. T he wealthier growers 
argued that the pegujaleros were too poor to produce high quality 
tobacco. T he Crown responded that if such people were not perm itted to 
cultivate tobacco they would have no means of earning an income. The 
Factor of O rizaba, M endiola, a candid individual, observed drily that 
’’above all else they (the pegujaleros) are the reserve body upon which
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the R enta counts against the threats of the tobacco growers.”31
Certainly by the first decade of the nineteenth century this pattern of 
differentiation within the core group seems to have established itself. 
Based on the growers receiving credit, you find a distribution pattern 
which suggests the existence of a strong middle group of small to
medium -  scale planters but, at the same time, what appears to be an 
expansion and consolidation of the elite group. Such differences did not 
go unnoticed by the tobacco growers who were well aware of the 
existence of a ’’privileged” group of planters. Reacting strongly to an 
assessment made by the Factor of O rizaba that the monopoly was 
responsible for the economic growth and prosperity of the villa, a
spokesman for the informally reconstituted común de cosecheros re­
sponded:3^
Se describen muchas y hermosas fábricas nuevas, otro tanto más opulento y 
decoroso en los vecinos, un  comercio brillante con un  rápido y lucroso giro, y 
todo por afecto de los beneficios que ha comunicado al establecimiento de 
esta R enta ... no es más que una violenta estracción del dinero ... reducida 
toda la utilidad verdadera a una corta parte á veinticinco o treinta comerci­
antes... 33
Given the existing information, any assessment of the beneficial 
effects bestowed upon the regional economy by the establishment of the 
monopoly must be a speculative exercise at this stage. A part from 
tobacco, sugar was the only other cash crop of significance. This
suffered from  two disadvantages, however, in that there was not a large 
market for it and, of more importance to the local farm ers, it demanded 
heavy capital investment. M igration and contraband were other possi­
bilities or, indeed, to work for the sugar hacendados or wealthy tobacco 
growers. A guaranteed buyer did not necessarily mean constant flows of 
capital into the economy -  such dependence upon a single crop could 
plunge the region into crisis as it was to do in 1782 and 1801. N ever­
theless, there were positive features which were direct results of the 
monopoly’s presence: the interest -  free credit which enabled wealthier 
planters the freedom to invest their own capital in other activities such as 
commerce and property; improvements of the highways from  Veracruz 
to Mexico City. This was designed to achieve two things: to improve the 
route from  O rizaba and C órdoba to Mexico City in order to speed up 
the transportation of tobacco from the growing regions to reduce wastage 
en route. In a wider context, the highway was conceived as part of a 
plan to encourage the import -  export trade centered in V eracruz but also
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to strenghten the development of the sugar and tobacco growing regions 
of Córdoba and O rizaba.34 This, in addition to the substantial comings 
and goings of the muleteers responsible for transporting the tobacco was 
designed to encourage the commerical development of the area.
III.
If  history has permitted the tobacco growers to give their views on 
the Tobacco Monopoly, it has not been so kind to their urban counter­
parts, the cigarreros. T he few protests that have survived reveal little of 
their struggle to withstand the decision of the General D irectorate and 
José de Gálvez to take over the private tobacco stores. T he ultimate 
testimony to their fate is their elimination and it is to this process and 
their replacement by the royal factories and estanquillos to which we now 
turn.
T he decision to control the m anufacture and sale of tobacco products 
was not without conflict. In 1764 when the initial discussions were in 
progress concerning this policy, Espinosa, one of the Director Generals 
pointed out to the Viceroy that between 5,000 and 6,000 individuals were 
occupied in the m anufacture and sale of tobacco and that they could not 
be left without em ploym ent.35 H e complained that the attem pt to 
create a tobacco factory in Puebla had been the cause of several riots in 
which leaflets had been distributed with statements such as ’’death to 
Spain, long live the English” followed by threats promising to burn down 
the monopoly offices. V elarde, the Fiscal (Treasury Attorney) received 
petitions which made obvious a ’’general repugnance” to the abolition of 
private m anufacture of tobacco products, i.e. puros and cigarros. On 
July 26, 1766, 30,000 people occupied the city of G uanajuato, threat­
ened to bum  the monopoly offices and demanded a return to control 
over the sale of leaf tobacco only. In  Decem ber of the same year, 
popular riots broke out in Puebla and O axaca, albeit on a smaller scale, 
but with the same objective -  withdrawal of the decision to take over 
the cigarrerías,36 José Gálvez, dismissive of any suggestions that there 
was a link between the riots and the decision to control the m anufacture 
and sale of tobacco products, began to outline how such control was to 
be achieved. T he transfer must be carried out, but in a way that would 
keep the potential social and economic dislocation to a m inim um . This 
was to be done by ensuring that the ex -  cigarrerías were absorbed by 
either the new monopoly stores or the royal factories. Initially emphasis 
was placed on the need for a gradual transition from private to state
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control over the m anufacture and sale of tobacco and tobacco products. 
All existing cigarrerías were declared non -  transferable through sales (at 
least to other private citizens), monopoly officials were to prepare regis­
ters of all the existing tobacco shops in Mexico City and tobacco fac­
tories were to be set up in the m ajor urban centers of New Spain -  
Mexico City, Q uerétaro , Puebla, G uadalajara. Factories were also 
eventually established in O rizaba, O axaca and Durango. T hus, for a 
period an uneasy co -  existence was maintained between private and 
state -  owned tobacco shops. It did not last for long. W ith the encour­
aging signs of a 50 percent ’’profit” figure from  Mexico City factory in 
1769 the General Directorate was motivated to speed up the process of 
elimination of the private shops.37 T o perm it the final transfer from 
private to public control, several surveys were carried out to determine 
location, age, family size, scale of operation and general economic con­
dition of the cigarreros of Mexico City. Based upon the results of these 
surveys those owners with the largest families, owners of advanced age 
or widows would be given first refusal on the offer of a license to 
operate an estanquillo. W hen all licenses had been allocated those 
cigarreros rem aining and their employees would be offered work in the 
Mexico City factory.
The takeover took about ten years to complete. In 1765, there were 
an estimated 543 cigarrerías in Mexico C ity .33 By 1772 they were 
down to 286. By 1775 all tobacco shops were in the hands of the 
monopoly. O ne hundred and ten estanquillos were in operation. Riva 
Agüero, one of the Director Generals, estimated that in order to achieve 
control, it had been necessary to relocate approximately 400 owners and 
1,700 tobacco workers.39 Clearly, the Mexico City factory bore the 
burden of absorbing the majority of displaced cigarreros. Indeed, 
although the figures available for the num ber of individuals involved in 
the tobacco trade and industry are, at best, dubious, if the m aximum 
estimate of 5,000 to 6,000 is taken, then the employment of 7,500 in the 
Mexico City factory indicates that extra jobs were created. This positive 
feature was counteracted, however, by the need to reduce the num ber of 
workers periodically after the 1790’s when acute shortages of paper 
resulted in lower production of cigarrettes.
T hus far, it has not proved possible to trace the pace of the takeover 
for the rest of New Spain. In  1772, well into the transition phase, the 
distribution of cigarrerías throughout the colony was as follows:*10
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General Administration of Mexico 
Factoría de Durango 
Factoría de Valladolid 
Factoría de Puebla 
Factoría de G uadalajara
739
104
204
72
386
As to the cigarreros themselves not that much is known. T hus far, 
only one of the surveys carried out by the monopoly has been located. 
Taken in 1773 it revealed that of the existing 146 cigarreros, approxi­
mately half were women, seventeen of whom were widows or daughters 
of the previous owners. T he total labour force employed in the shops 
amounted to 691, 30 percent of which was female. T he largest shop 
employed thirty -  one workers (all female) although the average shop 
employed between four and eight workers. Seven owners were classified 
as not needing their tobacco stores because they had other economic 
interests. Eight offered to sell their shops to the monopoly. O f the six 
who put prices on their stores, one wanted eleven pesos, three requested 
twenty pesos each, one, twenty -  five pesos and the final one suggested 
120 pesos. No indication of wages paid to the employees is given, or 
indeed, if the larger concerns operated with a system of wage labour at 
all. No direct statem ent of ethnic background is given. No assessment of 
daily takings is m ade.41 In the same year, 1773, the views of the 
comunidad de cigarreros were made known through the Procurador del 
núm ero de la Real Audiencia. They offer us a rare glimpse into the 
cigarreros’ self -  perceptions of their situation. They lamented that their 
families were being ruined by the operation of the Mexico City factory. 
T hey requested that the K ing order the elimination of the cigarrerías to 
be stopped and that the m anufacture of cigarros should rem ain free. 
T hey also emphasized the detrimental effect on women since so many 
derived their livelihood from  the m anufacture and sale of cigarros, not 
merely in Mexico City, but throughout the colony. They were thus being 
deprived of an honest livelihood and exposed to great dangers (i.e. 
prostitution).42 T he response to their pleas has already been described.
T he reaction of the General Directorate to accusations that the 
monopoly had caused nothing but misery and unemployment was that, 
on the contrary, the policy devised to effect the takeover was such that 
nobody would be left without some employment of some sort. T o what 
extent that was achieved is impossible to say. For those who were 
employed as estanquilleros, they were to receive a commission on sales 
for their salaries. However, there was a m inim um  and a m axim um  rate
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set to ensure that they received something. No estanquillero was to 
receive less than six reales per day nor more than twenty -  two reales. 
Commission on sales varied between 4 percent and 9 percent.4  ^ H ours 
of operation were between six a.m . and ten p .m . and only family 
members were permitted to work in the estanquillos. This was to be 
uniform throughout the colony. By 1780 the distribution of estanquillos 
throughout the cascos of the administrative divisions was as follows:44
Mexico City 64 G uadalajara 18 Córdoba 18
Valladolid 9 O rizaba 17 Veracruz 13
Puebla 26 O axaca 9 M érida 2
Durango 2 Rosario 1
T hus the option of opening up a tobacco store was removed from the 
list of possibilities available to New Spain’s artisans. Even the possibility 
of gaining a license became less feasible as limits were placed on the 
num ber of estanquillos which could operate. M oreover, the policy 
adopted after the takeover was completed was that if an estanquillo 
became vacant, retired monopoly bureaucrats or their widows or children 
were given preference am ong those seeking access to a license.
T he gradual takeover of the cigarrerías was accompanied by the 
parallel process of the creation of the royal factories. Between 1769 and 
1777 four factories became operational: Mexico City, Puebla, O axaca 
and O rizaba -  Q uerétaro  and G uadalajara were added two years later. 
It seems that there were no private ’’factories” as such. It was José de 
Gálvez who strenuously advocated their establishment in New Spain 
using the tobacco factory of Seville as a model. José de Gálvez’s views 
on the merits of the factories were quite clear. T he m anufacture of 
puros and cigarros was to be standardized and a steady supply of these 
made available throughout the colony. T he consum er was to be protected 
from  the fraudulent practices, allegedly carried out by the cigarreros. 
Chiles, ashes, and other ’’noxious substances” were often mixed in with 
the tobacco to give it ’’body.” Monopoly products were to be of the 
highest standard. Colonial society in general, Mexico City in particular, 
was to reap the benefits from  the ’’social” effects of the factories. For 
Gálvez, the Mexico City factory was
. ..ta n  beneficioso al Público como el mejor hospicio por el gran núm ero de 
pobres que se m antienen del jornal que ganan y por los muchos delitos que 
se evitan con el recojimiento voluntario de una m ultitud de ociosos y de 
m ujeres pobres que en aquel asilo socorren su necesidad y se livertan de
infinitos riesgos.
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Each factory was similar in structure and administration, the m ajor 
difference being the scale of operation. T he Mexico City factory 
produced the bulk of labrados (m anufactured products i.e. puros and 
cigarros) for distribution throughout New Spain, although each factory 
was responsible for supplying its immediate areas. Coahuila, M onterrey, 
Santander, M azapil and the factorías of Valladolid, G uadalajara, 
D urango and Rosario were supplied by the Mexico City factory. 
Q uerétaro  also supplied G uadalajara and Valladolid. G uadalajara, 
Puebla and O axaca were supplied by their own factories while O rizaba 
supplied V eracruz, C órdoba and parts of Puebla.“1® Table II shows the 
distribution of workers between the six factories for the quinquennium  
1 7 9 0 -9 5 . They emphasize two im portant characteristics of the factory 
structure: high employment of female workers and large num bers of 
pieceworkers.
TABLE II: Q uantities and Total Value o f  Tobacco Products Sold in 
N ew  Spain, 1 7 9 2 -1 8 0 6
Y ear
Lbs. of 
R aw  L eaf
Packets 
o f  H a v a n n a  
C igars
Packets of 
Dom estically 
Produced 
C igars
Packets of 
Dom estically 
Produced 
Cigarettes
Lbs. of 
S n u ff  (all 
Grades)
Total
V alue
(Pesos)
1773 1,387,091 3,486,635 28,548,635 19,456 3,089,270
1774 1,373,801 2,757,805 30,609,396 19,662 3,206,605
1775 1,073,565 3,325,117 40,936,966 20,246 3,681,861
1776 1,089,798 3,544,773 42,794,331 22,218 3,845,743
1792 348,564 9,585,744 89,930,721 17,549 6,705,635
1793 324,281 9,939,056 89,437,612 16,112 6,684,863
1796 347,590 10,426,393 99,108,282 17,663 7,336,539
1797 319,439 10,353,013 104,423,327 17,601 7,617,688
1798 247,975 1,208 12,338,321 113,752,168 21,827 8,251,574
1799 520,408 1,226 21,355,046 87,548,816 18,430 7,521,621
1800 635,024 3,415 15,163,510 89,989,580 20,682 7,433,459
1801 560,996 773 15,168,921 97,976,248 15,745 7,794,744
1802 611,646 1,640 14,648,040 95,104,840 24,285 7,686,824
1803 526,879 988 15,023,004 97,428,579 13,992 7,747,528
1804 539,568 826 15,141,370 99,822,406 14,465 7,910,719
1805 448,273 1,230 16,551,456 111,381,283 15,605 8,599,623
1806 345,457 1,621 16,712,433 121,377,189 14,672 9,116,392
Source: Com piled from  the R elaciones G enerales, the yearly accounts o f  the R oyal T obacco 
M onopoly for the  years 1773 -  1776 and 1792 -  1806.
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The labour force of the Mexico City factory can be divided into 
three m ajor groups.47 T he administrative and supervisory personnel 
included the factory m anager, accountants, carpenters, foremen and 
forewomen, guards and clerks. They received annual salaries or fixed 
daily rates with a range from fifty -  three to 2,000 pesos per annum. 
T he second group was comprised of workers with specific tasks such as 
preparation of the raw leaf, shredding it, packing up the labrados and 
stamping boxes. T heir wages were within a range of n in e ty -o n e  pesos 
to 249 pesos per annum . T he third group, the pieceworkers, constituted 
the bulk of the work force. They carried out the actual m anufacture of 
puros and cigarros, and included cutters, twisters and fillers. The 
majority received between three and eight reales a day with average 
annual incomes of between 100 and 271 pesos.48 Overall, women 
received marginally less than their male counterparts. Although maestros 
de mesa and maestras de mesa both received one peso per day, a 
maestro  was in charge of 119 workers while a maestra had 160 women 
to supervise. No Indians were found in the ranks of the administrative or 
supervisory personnel. For the year 1800, of the 7,074 factory workers, 
525 were Indian tributaries (7.4 percent of total workers).49
Although some workers gained increases in wages (mainly between 
1771 and 1779) the majority did not (see Table III). Like the growers 
and, indeed, most other colonial workers, they were highly susceptible to 
the inflationary pinch of the late eighteenth century. V ery early on, 
however, in the history of the Mexico City factory the tobacco workers 
organized a mutual -  aid society known as the Concordia. By deducting 
one half real each week from  m em bers’ wages a common fund was 
created which provided aid in times of emergency, illness for example. 
In 1771 the factory m anager, Isidro Romafia, estimated that the
Concordia had 5,600 members with total funds on hand of 70,394
50pesos.
It has been estimated that by 1790 the tobacco workers constituted 
11.6 percent of the economically active population of Mexico C ity .51 
Indeed, by 1795 the Mexico City factory employed 59 percent of all 
tobacco workers employed in the six royal factories. T he m ajor d iffe r­
ence between the tobacco workers and other workers (particularly those 
employed in the obrajes) was the nature of their labour. Thus far, no 
evidence of extra -  economic coercion has been found with regard to
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TABLE III: Wages and Salaries o f  the M exico C ity Factory Personnel
(Selected)
PO SITIO N  1771
Y E A R  
1779 1788
S
1794 1801
a. Yearly Salaries and Fixed Daily Wage (Pesos) 
Administrador 1,400 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Contador 800 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
M aestro Mayor 500 -  550 400 -  600 600 500 600
M aestra Mayor 350 -  400 350 -  450 350 -4 5 0 350 -  450
b. Piecework (Reales)
Maestros de Mesa - 8 8 8 -
Envolvedores* - 4 -  4.5 4.5 -  5.25 4.5 -  6.5 -
Encajonadores* - 4 4 -
Operarios - - 2 - 4 -
Source: M cW atters , Table 7, p .245
Note: Envolvedores were employed to prepare the packs for the cigarros and
wrap them according to their classification.
Encajonadores were packers who put the packs of cigarros into large 
wooden boxes, ready for distribution to other parts of the colony.
work in the tobacco factories. Piecework rates were neither exceptionally 
high nor low in comparison with other occupations.52 Throughout the 
final decades of the eighteenth century the state tobacco factories became 
a focal point of criticism for several reasons. For lack of space only two 
can be discussed briefly. T he first attack was based upon the alleged 
decline in ’’profits” of the factories, particularly that of Mexico City. O ne 
estimate showed that the Mexico City factory’s ’’profits” had fallen from 
50 percent in 1769 to 28 percent in 1794.55 This is not a marginal 
profit calculation and apparently was designed to show that it was more 
profitable to sell the leaf tobacco only and return m anufacture of cigars 
and cigarettes to the private sector. T able IV  shows the volume and 
value of sales of tobacco products in New Spain for 1773 -  1806. Both
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packets of cigars and cigarettes show stable production levels. Reduced 
production is generally related to shortages of paper.
TABLE IV: Distribution o f  Fixed D aily W age and Pieceworkers in the 
M exico C ity Factory, 1795
Factory
Salary and Fixed 
Daily Wage
Male Female
% of 
Total 
Workers
Pieceworkers 
M ale Female
% of 
Total 
Workers
Total 
N um ber 
of Workers
México 373 64 6 3,646 2,991 94 7,074
(.) ucrr t aro 76 15 7 716 590 93 1,397
G uadalajara 18 18 2 - 1,514 98 1,550
Puebla 57 15 7 460 495 93 1,027
Oaxaca 21 7 5 - 582 95 610
Orizaba 11 3 4 149 192 96 355
12,013
Source: Estado de los empleados de las fábricas de la Real R enta del Tabaco de
este Reyno, México, 20 Ju ly  1795, Francisco M aniau y O rtega, AGN 
México, Tabaco, V. 495.
T he second criticism concerned the dangers inherent in the high 
concentration of workers in the Mexico City factory. T he workers had 
already rioted twice, in 1780 and in 1794, prim arily due to increases in 
their work quotas without a concomitant increase in wages. T he ’’solu­
tion” was to divide the Mexico City factory into three separate units, one 
of which was the especially constructed and first state -  owned tobacco 
factory which was opened in 1807.
The m anagm ent and operation of the factories, their profitability and 
production costs all require careful consideration but cannot be dealt with 
here. A general question underlying any analysis of the tobacco factories 
is, to what extent they can be characterized as state -  induced industriali-
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zation. State control and managem ent resulted in a change in the division 
of labour upon which the m anufacture of tobacco products was based. 
T here  were no technical innovations, however, and manual labour pre­
dominated. T here was clearly an emphasis upon a quantitative expansion 
of production but not toward a qualitative change in the mode of pro­
duction. As such it is difficult to disagree with M oreno Toscano’s 
observation that
el cambio o modificación principal que introdujo la fábrica de cigarros fue la 
concentración de un núm ero grande de operarios en el establecimiento de la 
fábrica. Esta concentración en lugar de originarse en la necesidad de mejorar 
el proceso productivo, tuvo por causa una medida política de carácter 
monopólico impuesta por la Corona con fines fiscales.51
For colonial society in general the Royal Tobacco Monopoly provoked 
a variety of responses. T he Consulado de México, ever vigilant in its 
mission to prove the ’’harm ful” effects of the monopoly, argued that it 
worked against the development of New Spain.
Las fábricas de todos los cigarros y puros que se gastan en el Reyno, se han 
fixado en Orizaba, Oaxaca, Puebla, México, Q uerétaro y G uadalajara, 
dejando de todas las demas poblaciones sin esta ocupación y quitándoles una 
m ultitud de familias á servir á aquellos seis lugares privilegiados. En ellos se 
viven con la sugeción y reconocimiento de Parroquias que en donde nacie­
ron ... pero ... una vida la mas licensiosa y criminosa en spiritual y 
tem poral.55
Amidst the Consulado’s painful lam ent of how the implementation of 
the factory system had broken up families and exposed decent people to 
the sexual immoralities of working in a factory, were complaints con­
cerning the economic effects of the monopoly. Strong productive male 
labour was being wasted in the factories when it could be used in agri­
culture or in the mines. Moreover, it was labour used to produce profits 
which were then shipped out of the country. O ne of the monopoly’s most 
vociferous critics was the Padre Antonio de San José M uro, a 
’’Bethlemite” friar who seems to have devoted himself to a one man 
campaign against the monopoly.56 Although he pointed to the evils of 
monopoly in general, one of his m ajor concerns was the ill effects the 
factories had upon their workers. Conducive to blasphemy, licentious 
behaviour and subversion, the Mexico City factory was nothing short of 
’’una casa de perdición.”57 In response to such attacks the Director 
General asserted that far from breeding delinquent citizens, not only was
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the Mexico City factory a manufactory for puros and cigarros but ”ha 
sido destinado taller para hombres de b ien ...”58 Overall, consumers 
benefitted from the monopoly because they purchased better quality 
products. From the labour required by the factories emerged a group of 
producers and consumers simultaneously benefitting both New Spain and 
the metropolis. At least that is how the General Directorate perceived 
the effects of the monopoly. Mexico City could not fail to gain from  the 
operation of the factory, since
continuaría tam bién el m aior fomento que recive esta Capital en sus 
comercios transcendiendo á otros, con la circulación del crecido caudal de 
mas de 750,000 pesos que se distribuye anualm ente en la Gente operaría que 
se ocupa en la labor de puros y cigarros. ^
IV .
M uch of what constitutes the history of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly 
rem ains untouched. However, a  general picture has emerged of what the 
production of four million pesos implied. M any of the hallmarks of 
eighteenth century mercantilism are to be found in the Spanish state’s 
managem ent of the tobacco monopoly in New Spain: an emphasis upon 
large centralized m anufactures and capital contributions in the form  of 
the interest -  free credit allocated to encourage the cultivation of tobacco. 
Such m anagem ent signified much more than an exercise in the raising of 
revenues. T he reorganizations and restrictions which typified the abso­
lutist Bourbon reforms were applied with a vigour which was felt 
throughout the colony. Farm ers in New Spain were effectively prohibited 
from  growing tobacco apart from  the "privileged” who lived and worked 
in the province of V eracruz. W ithin a region largely dependent upon 
tobacco for its survival there emerged an elite m erchant -  planter group 
who manipulated the conditions created by the monopoly to their own 
advantage. T he less able were subject to insolvency and destitution in the 
face of poor harvests and unsym pathetic bureaucrats. If  the cultivation 
of the crop was confined to the rural southeast, manufactures were 
firmly established in the m ajor urban centres of New Spain, especially 
Mexico City. Production of cigars and cigarettes was removed from  the 
hands of private artisans and placed into those of the workers employed 
in state -  managed factories -  a sweeping change and one which is too 
easily ignored or underestim ated. N urtured by the Bourbon state, the 
tobacco monopoly was to survive its demise only to experience its own in 
the new M exican republic.
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